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More or Less Bunk: The Establishment Clause 
Answers That History Doesn’t Provide 
Steven G. Gey ∗ 
The jurisprudence of the First Amendment’s religion clauses is 
one of the most history-laden of any area of constitutional law. From 
the beginning of the modern era in the Court’s church-state 
jurisprudence, nearly every discussion of note regarding the meaning 
of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses has revolved around 
the country’s religious history. 
When the Supreme Court first announced that the Establishment 
Clause was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause and therefore applicable to the states, much of the 
Court’s discussion concerned religious discrimination in the early 
colonies and the fight over religious establishments more than a 
century and a half earlier in Virginia.1 When the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of legislative prayers several decades later, it did so 
largely on the ground that Congress had itself hired a chaplain nearly 
two centuries earlier.2 When Justice Thomas recently argued in favor 
of government funding of religious schools, he relied on the 
“shameful pedigree” of anti-Catholic discrimination during the 
nineteenth century.3 Members of the Court even argue about 
whether the views of particular historical figures deserve recognition 
 
 ∗ David and Deborah Fonvielle and Donald and Janet Hinkle Professor of Law, 
Florida State University College of Law. J.D., 1982, Columbia University; B.A., 1978, Eckerd 
College. 
 1. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11–13 (1947); id. at 31–42 (Rutledge, J., 
dissenting). 
 2. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). Chief Justice Burger observed: 
It can hardly be thought that in the same week Members of the First 
Congress voted to appoint and to pay a chaplain for each House and also 
voted to approve the draft of the First Amendment for submission to the 
states, they intended the Establishment Clause of the Amendment to 
forbid what they had just declared acceptable. 
Id. at 790.  
 3. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828–29 (2000). 
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in debates about the Constitution’s original meaning. Although the 
Court has long based its interpretation of the religion clauses on the 
views of Thomas Jefferson, for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist has 
argued that Jefferson’s views "are less than [an] ideal source of 
contemporary history" of the Establishment Clause because at the 
time the First Amendment was written Jefferson was in France.4 
The problem is not that any of these historical discussions are 
inaccurate or entirely irrelevant to the discussion of the meaning of 
the religion clauses. The problem, rather, is that these discussions are 
so selective and tendentiously one-sided that they contribute little to 
a reasonable understanding of the modern theory of the First 
Amendment. Consider the other side of the four historical 
discussions mentioned in the previous paragraph. Although in its 
first major examination of the Establishment Clause the Court 
correctly noted that James Madison and other opponents defeated 
Governor Patrick Henry’s Bill for Religious Assessments, for 
example, the Court neglected to mention that other states such as 
Massachusetts would continue to finance religious exercises well into 
the next century.5 Likewise, although the first Congress indeed paid 
for legislative chaplains, the author of the First Amendment himself 
would later write that this action directly contravened the 
Establishment Clause.6 As for Justice Thomas’s citation to anti-
Catholic discrimination as the impetus for resistance to government 
financing of religion, he failed to note the abundant evidence of 
nondiscriminatory opposition to such financing—including the 
evidence amassed during the Court’s earlier foray into the history of 
the battle over religious assessments in Virginia.7 Finally, the illogic 
 
 4. Compare Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (identifying Jefferson 
as "an acknowledged leader of the advocates of the measure [i.e., the First Amendment]" and 
noting that his views "may be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope and 
effect of the amendment thus secured"), with Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that Jefferson was in France at the time Congress passed the 
First Amendment and concluding that “[h]e would seem to any detached observer as a less 
than ideal source of contemporary history as to the meaning of the Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment”). 
 5. See Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the 
Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1458. 
 6. James Madison, untitled manuscript, reprinted in Elizabeth Fleet, Madison’s 
“Detached Memoranda,” 3 WM. & MARY Q. 534, 558–62 (1946). 
 7. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8–13 (1947); id. at 31–42 (Rutledge, J., 
dissenting). 
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of Justice Rehnquist’s attempt to banish from discussions of church-
state relations the author of the Virginia Bill for Establishing 
Religious Freedom speaks for itself. Jefferson’s views on the First 
Amendment may not be, as Chief Justice Waite once asserted, 
“authoritative,”8 but they clearly contribute a great deal to the 
interpretive matrix in which the meaning of the First Amendment 
must be defined. 
The frequent use—and misuse—of history in current discussions 
of religion-clause doctrine comes to mind in reading Carl Esbeck’s 
contribution to this conference on the church-state settlement in the 
early American republic.9 Professor Esbeck provides an excellent 
survey of the various approaches to the church-state relationship 
throughout the early republic and mostly avoids the historical 
selectiveness of many other judicial opinions and academic articles on 
the subject. His article provides the full flavor of the rich diversity 
evident in early American religious and political culture. 
My main cavil regarding Professor Esbeck’s account concerns a 
few of the lessons he attempts to draw from this history. In 
particular, this Comment contests two central themes of Professor 
Esbeck’s account. First, I believe Professor Esbeck is wrong to 
suggest that history provides any definitive answers to the various 
issues raised by the Establishment Clause. As Professor Esbeck’s own 
historical evidence indicates, the history of religion in this country is 
a complicated and even contradictory affair. Second, to the extent 
that historical evidence supports any theory of the Establishment 
Clause, it certainly does not support Professor Esbeck’s conclusion 
that the Establishment Clause permits the government to derive 
public policies directly from religious principles and justifications. 
The only historical evidence that supports such an interpretation of 
the Establishment Clause involves instances of overt political 
favoritism of Protestant Christianity—the sort of historical tendency 
that one hopes this much more religiously diverse country has now 
moved beyond. After sketching the themes that can be drawn from 
Professor Esbeck’s discussion of early American religious history, I 
 
 8. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (writing that Jefferson’s views 
are “accepted almost as an authoritative declaration”). 
 9. Esbeck, supra note 5. 
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will turn to the lessons these themes suggest for modern 
Establishment Clause doctrine. 
I. THE THEMES OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
Professor Esbeck’s rendition of the history of religion in America 
provides a good example of the difficulties posed by attempts to 
define present doctrine by reference to past practices. In short, there 
is no one history of religion in America. There are actually multiple 
histories, each of which would support a somewhat different 
interpretation of the proper constitutional relationship between 
religion and government. Ascribing a current meaning to the 
Constitution’s religion clauses requires choosing among the various 
alternative (and often conflicting) historical models of church-state 
relations. 
Consider just two of the conflicting currents of history in the 
evidence assembled by Professor Esbeck. First, consider the very 
different ways in which the original states dealt with the problem of 
religious establishments. As Professor Esbeck notes, it is common 
practice to cluster the original states into three groups: the New 
England states, whose political regimes based on Puritan 
establishments lasted well into the nineteenth century in states like 
Massachusetts; the middle states, which tended to have weak 
religious establishments or none at all; and the southern states, 
which started out with Anglican establishments but soon pursued 
disestablishment to accommodate both the surge of Protestant 
dissenters and the hostility toward an Anglican church that was 
closely associated with the former colonial ruler.10 What is one to 
make of this history? A consistent theme is hard to derive, except 
insofar as it is clear that the trend throughout the country was away 
from religious establishments.11 Even Massachusetts abandoned its 
 
 10. Id. at 1457–59. 
 11. One response to the assertion that there is no clear trend in the states is to fall back 
on the federalism interpretation of the First Amendment, which asserts that the First 
Amendment was little more than a limitation on the federal government’s ability to interfere 
with the various states’ approaches to church-state relations. See, e.g., id. at 1576. There are 
several problems with this response. First, it rests on the controversial premise that the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment did not federalize rights by applying the principles of 
the Bill of Rights to the states. Whatever meager merits this approach may have in the abstract, 
it does nothing to help define the scope of the First Amendment in the context of the modern 
constitutional universe. For better or worse, it is long settled that the First Amendment has 
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Puritan establishment before the new country had existed more than 
a few decades.12 But it is unquestionably true that the different 
sectors of the country exhibited very different attitudes toward 
institutional religion and its direct influence over public policy. 
The second set of conflicting currents running through American 
religious history reinforces the first. This is the tendency of religious 
fervor to rise and fall during different historical periods. Professor 
Esbeck details how the First and Second Great Awakenings were split 
by a period of relatively muted religious feelings in the period 
leading up to the American Revolution.13 The American Revolution 
occurred during this interregnum. At the time of the Revolution, 
religious feelings were not the primary concern of the American 
political or social culture. It is true that during the Awakenings 
religion came more to the fore, but even then religious Americans 
were often indifferent. As Professor Esbeck points out, “few 
Americans formally joined a church (though they still attended 
regularly), and fewer still took part in the sacrament of 
 
been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and is therefore applicable to state and 
local government action. E.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (“The First 
Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the 
legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.”). But see Elk Grove 
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2328 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(arguing that “the Establishment Clause is a federalism provision, which, for this reason, resists 
incorporation”). 
Second, even if one accepts the modern application of the federalism interpretation of 
the First Amendment, it is by no means clear that the states ratifying the First Amendment 
intended by their vote to embrace the legitimacy of overt religious establishments such as those 
found in the New England states at the time. Certainly it would be difficult to conceive of any 
such endorsement from states such as Rhode Island and Pennsylvania, which never had 
religious establishments and strongly resisted religious interference with state affairs. See 
Esbeck, supra note 5, at 1414. Using the policies of the proestablishment states to give 
meaning to the modern Establishment Clause is especially problematic given the fact that three 
of the seven states that continued to maintain some form of formal religious establishment in 
1791—Connecticut, Georgia, and Massachusetts—did not even ratify the Bill of Rights until 
the twentieth century. See U.S. CONST. amend. I, reprinted in 1 U.S.C. at lxii n.12 (2000) 
(listing ratification dates). 
 12. Esbeck, supra note 5, at 1524. 
 13. Id. at 1451 (“Between the two Awakenings there was an interruption in church 
growth and a pause in interest in spiritual matters. This was caused, in part, by preoccupation 
with the Revolutionary War . . . .”). 
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communion.”14 When the often lackadaisical religious allegiance of 
much of the population is coupled with the influence of rationalists 
like Ethan Allen and Thomas Paine, and Deists like James Madison 
and Thomas Jefferson, the religious picture of the United States at 
its founding appears much more complicated than that of an 
overwhelmingly devout polity concerned with preserving the cultural 
influence of religion in general and religious organizations in 
particular. This more complicated atmosphere casts doubt on 
Professor Esbeck’s argument that principles requiring “a socially or 
juridically enforced separation of religious values from public 
affairs . . . [have] no antecedent in the early American republic.”15 
Amidst these inconsistent and even contradictory elements 
defining the American religious atmosphere leading up to and 
immediately following the founding, there are a few uniform themes 
that one may say define the church-state landscape in the early 
republic. Two themes that appear throughout Professor Esbeck’s 
account strongly support the liberal protection of religious liberty. A 
third theme, however, tends to contradict assumptions about 
widespread public support for any such protection. 
The first liberal theme is the steady growth of voluntarism, 
individualism, and religious privatism in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries—to the point that by the beginning of the 
nineteenth century this characteristic had become a defining feature 
of the American religious experience. Professor Esbeck chronicles 
how even the traditionally hierarchical and structurally rigid churches 
had to adapt to this quintessentially American approach to religious 
faith and practice.16 The Anglican Church reconstituted itself after 
the Revolution, significantly loosening its ties with the mother 
church in England and strengthening the laity’s control over local 
officials and governing structures.17 Similar changes occurred in the 
American Methodist and (to a somewhat lesser extent) Catholic 
churches.18 Professor Esbeck recounts how these religious traits 
coincided with many of the new country’s political preferences and 
 
 14. Id. at 1451 n.224. 
 15. Id. at 1393 n.20. 
 16. Id. at 1547–51.  
 17. Id. at 1559–61 & nn.634–38. 
 18. Id. at 1561–62. 
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attributes.19 Religious themes therefore dovetailed with the 
individualistic political themes in the writings of John Locke, as well 
as with those of Jefferson, Madison, and other American secular 
political elites.20 
The second consistent theme running through Professor 
Esbeck’s account is related to the first. The notions of voluntarism 
and individualism that characterized the American religious culture 
around the time of the Revolution were accompanied by an 
antiauthoritarian spirit that viewed all hierarchies and authoritarian 
structures as suspicious and even antithetical to the emerging 
American ethos.21 In part, this was a natural outgrowth from the 
political opposition to the country’s British overlords; more 
generally, it was also part of a recurrent American resistance to any 
centralized authority—either political or religious. This helps explain 
the joint action of religious dissenters and secularist liberals in 
opposing proposed state and federal religious establishments, but it 
also has implications for determining the broader meaning of the 
legal term “establishment of religion.” The clearest implication of 
this antiauthoritarianism is that any attempt to assert the 
preeminence of God’s will over secular legislation cuts against one of 
the deepest grains in the American character. Professor Esbeck 
correctly notes that modern proposals to erect state-sponsored Ten 
Commandments displays are contrary to this antiestablishment trait: 
“We should expect these arguments to lose, and for the most part 
they do.”22 
In contrast to the complementary and liberty-enhancing themes 
of individualism and antiauthoritarianism, there is a third theme in 
Professor Esbeck’s account that reveals a darker trend in the 
country’s early religious and political history. This third theme is the 
persistent favoritism of Protestant Christianity. Even as states 
embraced disestablishment values, their actions often continued to 
favor Protestantism. Examples of this tendency span the country. 
Despite North Carolina’s abandonment of its Anglican establishment 
 
 19. Id. at 1564–66. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See id. at 1456 & n.239. 
 22. Id. at 1583.  
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in 1776, it still had a “decidedly Protestant” general establishment.23 
New Hampshire finally abandoned its religious tax by adopting the 
Toleration Act in 1819, but “maintained the conception that New 
Hampshire was a Christian—in fact a Protestant—commonwealth.”24 
As Professor Esbeck notes, even though the culture of the 
Revolutionary era was clearly more accommodating to dissenting 
Protestants, it still exhibited persistent hostility toward non-
Protestants and especially Catholics, Jews, and nonbelievers.25 Even 
the rare state of Vermont, which eventually broadened its religious 
tax laws to include Catholics, continued to exclude from the benefits 
of these laws Deists, Jews, and Universalists.26 The stark reality was 
that “[o]nly one of the thirteen states [Rhode Island] under the 
Articles of Confederation afforded equal rights to all non-Protestants 
with respect to the practice of religion.”27 Modern paeans to 
religious ecumenicalism notwithstanding, this country has a long and 
sordid history of viewing some faiths as “more equal” than others. At 
best, as Justice Story would later write, “[t]he real object of the 
[First] amendment was, not to countenance, much less to advance 
Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity; 
but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects . . . .”28 
II. THE LESSONS OF HISTORY 
The only incontestable statement that one can make about the 
historical materials reviewed by Professor Esbeck is that the history 
of religion in the early republic is varied and often contradictory.29 
What other lessons can be drawn from Professor Esbeck’s account of 
the various themes in the country’s early history? Professor Esbeck 
draws three conclusions from his historical account. 
First, Esbeck notes that the history of the American religious 
experience is defined largely by the victory of voluntarism. He 
concludes that separationism has a legitimate pedigree to the extent 
 
 23. Id. at 1483. 
 24. Id. at 1533–34 & n.539. 
 25. Id. at 1504 n.417. 
 26. Id. at 1527. 
 27. Id. at 1550. 
 28. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 728 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833). 
 29. Esbeck, supra note 5, at 1393. 
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that it draws on this voluntarist tradition, but he also argues for a 
particular kind of separationism—one that protects individual 
conscience but is at the same time intended primarily to protect the 
independent prerogatives of the church. Under this version of 
separationism, the government remains amenable to “moral values 
based on religion [that are welcome] in the marketplace of ideas and 
in the formation of public policy and law.”30 
The second general conclusion Professor Esbeck draws from his 
historical account is that “American liberals” have been unfaithful to 
the American religious settlement by “attempting to drive the 
religious voice out of the public square.”31 According to Professor 
Esbeck, examples of this phenomenon include restrictions on 
religious speech in public buildings and schools.32 Esbeck argues that 
the Supreme Court should respond to these actions by saying “once 
and for all” that it is not possible to use Establishment Clause 
concerns as a compelling interest to justify “overrid[ing] free speech 
or free exercise rights.”33 
Finally, the third lesson Professor Esbeck draws from history is 
the idea that the Establishment Clause is primarily a structural 
provision intended to impose a “one-way restraint” against 
governmental intrusion into the realm of religious organizations.34 
From Professor Esbeck’s perspective, therefore, the separation of 
church and state is properly viewed as separation of the state from 
the church, but not the other way around. “When separation of 
church and state is taken to mean a socially or juridically enforced 
separation of religious values from public affairs and governmental 
policy formation, such separation has no antecedent in the early 
American republic.”35 
Some of Professor Esbeck’s conclusions are unexceptionable. 
Certainly the need to protect individual religious conscience is a 
logical outgrowth of the early religious disputes that led to the 
voluntarist religious settlement. Likewise, the introduction of 
 
 30. Id. at 1579–80.  
 31. Id. at 1584–85. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 1586. 
 34. Id. at 1389 n.9.  
 35. Id. at 1393 n.20. 
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religious ideas into the intellectual marketplace and the welcoming of 
religious speakers into the public forum are equally laudable. Even 
the structuralist interpretation of the Establishment Clause is not 
problematic, at least if the theory is described at a fairly high level of 
generality and not used as the basis for denying individuals the right 
to enforce the protections of the Clause.36 But some of Professor 
 
 36. A structural interpretation of the Establishment Clause may cause procedural 
enforcement problems in two respects. First, the Supreme Court has recently become reluctant 
to infer private rights of action from structural legal provisions. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 
U.S. 273 (2002) (refusing to infer a private right of action from the federal Family Educational 
Rights and Privacy Act); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (refusing to infer a 
private right of action to enforce Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act). Although these cases 
involved statutes rather than constitutional provisions, they cast some doubt on older 
precedents in which the Court expressed a willingness to infer individual rights from structural 
constitutional provisions such as the Commerce Clause. See Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 
(1991) (inferring a private right of action from the Commerce Clause). In a possible indication 
of things to come, the Court recently refused to extend the implied constitutional remedy 
originally promulgated in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388 (1971) (allowing private suits for damages against federal agents who allegedly 
violate a citizen’s constitutional rights), to suits against private actors who allegedly violate the 
Constitution while operating under color of federal law. Correctional Serv’s Corp. v. Malesko, 
534 U.S. 61 (2001). In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia underscored the Court’s more 
restrictive modern view of implied rights of action: 
Bivens is a relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers 
to create causes of action—decreeing them to be “implied” by the mere existence of 
a statutory or constitutional prohibition. As the Court points out, we have 
abandoned that power to invent “implications” in the statutory field. There is even 
greater reason to abandon it in the constitutional field, since an “implication” 
imagined in the Constitution can presumably not even be repudiated by Congress. 
Id. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations and internal cross-references omitted). 
A second way in which Professor Esbeck’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause 
may implicate the ability to enforce that clause is through the standing doctrine. An 
overemphasis on the structural operation of the Establishment Clause, to the exclusion of the 
individual rights implications of that clause, may lead the Court to consider all individual 
efforts to enforce the provision as generalized grievances, which would fail to satisfy the Article 
III cases and controversies requirement. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 
418 U.S. 208 (1974) (holding that an attempt to enforce the Incompatibility Clause was a 
generalized grievance); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (holding that an 
attempt to enforce the constitutional requirement of a regular statement and account of 
government expenditures was a generalized grievance). Although Establishment Clause 
challenges involving the expenditure of government money for religious purposes may 
circumvent the generalized grievance problem via the taxpayer standing mechanism, see Flast v. 
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), it is not always simple to identify the financing nexus that is a 
necessary component of that standard, see, e.g., Alabama Freethought Ass’n v. Moore, 893 F. 
Supp. 1522 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (denying taxpayer-standing status to plaintiffs who failed to 
show that the government spent money purchasing or maintaining a Ten Commandments 
plaque hanging in a state courtroom). 
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Esbeck’s conclusions are more dubious, and his attempt to link these 
conclusions with the country’s early religious history—and thereby 
give them legitimacy and an added jurisprudential heft in modern 
constitutional debates—illustrates how treacherous such 
constitutional historicism can be. 
My main reservations about Professor Esbeck’s conclusions 
pertain to his contention that, based on the country’s early history, it 
should be permissible for the government to use religion as the basis 
for the formation of public policy and legal rules.37 It is one thing to 
insist that religion should contribute to the marketplace of ideas 
along with other perspectives; it is quite another to propose that 
religion should be used by the government as the basis for public 
policy decisions and the legal mandates that enforce those decisions 
on everyone in society. The former proposition is the inevitable 
consequence of a vibrant private sector in which a liberal society 
encourages multiple religious allegiances to flourish. The latter 
proposition is the first step toward crushing a healthy religious 
pluralism under the boot of religious majoritarianism. Indeed, 
Professor Esbeck’s support for both private-sector religious pluralism 
and religiously motivated legislation illustrates the dangers of 
attempting to draw modern constitutional conclusions from 
historical experience. Here is one of Professor Esbeck’s conclusions 
about the historical basis of religiously motivated politics: 
[A] separation of religion-based values from government and 
public affairs would have been received with wide disapprobation in 
the new nation. This is because civic virtue, now to be formed in 
the independent sectors of home, church, voluntary society, and 
school, was still deemed essential for the orderly exercise of liberty 
and acquisition of the self-discipline necessary to sustaining a 
republic.38 
This is probably a fair summary of the spirit prevailing at the time 
of the founding. But the reasons the governing elite of the new 
country believed religion was a necessary component of public affairs 
are far more problematic in the modern era. The founders of the 
country believed religion was an indispensable ingredient of 
 
 37. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 5, at 1393 n.20. 
 38. Id. at 1580. 
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governance because they uniformly thought of the country as a 
Protestant Christian nation. Whether or not they articulated the 
implications of their views as clearly as Justice Story eventually did,39 
those governing the early republic had an exclusionary view of the 
link between religion and civic virtue. Religion—by which the 
founders meant Protestant Christianity—contributed to the values 
advanced by the government in part to ensure that the government 
would not be infected by the values of other groups the founders 
perceived as iniquitous. Those falling within the excluded category 
would include several groups—Catholics, Jews, Muslims, rationalists, 
and others—that now constitute a large and growing portion of the 
modern country’s population. One cannot embrace the legitimacy of 
a religiously based political regime without also explaining how to 
overcome the exclusionary nature of that regime.40 
It is unlikely that, in the modern world, an explanation can ever 
be devised to work around the unacceptable consequences of 
religiously based politics. In the far more pluralistic modern context, 
citizens of the United States will never be able to coalesce around 
one core set of faith-based political values. From a religious 
perspective, we simply cannot agree—as the Framers probably 
could—about which specific religious values should predominate, or 
about which public values should follow from the chosen religious 
perspective, or even about whether religion should play a direct role 
in the public sphere. 
At one point, Professor Esbeck argues that his structural 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause is preferable to an 
individual-rights model because Establishment Clause battles under 
an individual-rights model inevitably dissolve into culture wars.41 
Esbeck argues that battles over the Establishment Clause are 
inevitably fractious because the “Establishment Clause . . . is often 
portrayed as addressing ‘who’s in charge’—that is, the worldview 
(religious and nonreligious) that holds the mantle of cultural 
authority. Such culture wars are divisive.”42 The obvious response to 
this assertion is that if we permit the government to enact and 
 
 39. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 40. See Steven G. Gey, Unity of the Graveyard and the Attack on Constitutional 
Secularism, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1005. 
 41. Esbeck, supra note 5, at 1390 n.11. 
 42. Id. 
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enforce religiously based public policy, culture wars become not only 
inevitable but also more momentous. 
This is because religion involves deep and uncompromising 
beliefs about ultimate goods. In a country as diverse as the modern 
United States, religious disputes will therefore inevitably involve 
disputes over various groups’ mutually irreconcilable concepts of 
ultimate goods. In the modern era, these disputes are likely to be 
even more intense—because the range of religious variation is more 
extreme—than the often-violent religious factionalism the Framers 
experienced. If government policies can incorporate the religious 
values of the political victors, then each group is likely to compete 
even more vigorously to control the key apparatus for infusing the 
culture with their vision of a proper society. 
The only way around a potentially destructive war of competing 
ultimates is to read the Establishment Clause as mandating a mode 
of politics in which the reasons for political decisions are cast in a 
form that are accessible to all and do not resort to exclusionary 
articles of religious faith. Obviously, this is not a new or unique idea. 
It is basically a claim that the government must abide by something 
akin to the requirements of Rawlsian public reason—i.e., that 
legislation should only be justified on terms that are perceived as 
reasonable to people of diametrical worldviews and ultimate beliefs.43 
This requirement can be incorporated into a structural view of the 
operation of the Establishment Clause, but contrary to Professor 
Esbeck’s claim,44 an interpretation of the First Amendment that 
incorporates this view necessarily will grant individual citizens the 
right to be free from state-imposed religion. Without such a right, 
any structural protections offered by the Establishment Clause would 
be substantively empty and impossible to enforce in any event.45 
 
 43. See JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in THE LAW OF PEOPLES 
129, 131–32 (1999). The emphasis on regulating public rationales for legislation provides an 
effective balance between the free exercise and free speech rights of politicians to believe what 
they will in their private capacities and the Establishment Clause interest in protecting 
nonsectarian governance over a pluralistic society. 
 44. See Esbeck, supra note 5, at 1388 (“Avoiding treatment of the Establishment Clause 
as an individual right to be free from religion is important here.”). 
 45. See supra note 36. 
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There is ample historical support for this reading of the 
Establishment Clause. To cite only the most obvious examples, this 
reading of the Clause is implicit in Jefferson’s notorious wall-of-
separation metaphor46 and in Madison’s elaborate comments in his 
Memorial and Remonstrance on the inevitably corrupting effect 
religious establishments have on both religion and government.47 On 
the other hand, I also recognize that barring the government from 
using religion as the basis for legislation and other forms of public 
policy would have been an anathema to many of those living at the 
time the Constitution was crafted. But we no longer have the luxury 
of governing the country as if multiple waves of immigration and the 
attendant explosion of different forms of religious belief (and 
nonbelief) have not changed the face of the country the Framers 
knew. With regard to our determination of what the Constitution 
means today, the contradictory historical evidence is simply not 
dispositive. The history of the Constitution will always contribute 
depth and texture to discussions of constitutional theory and 
application. But it is time to shift the focus of constitutional 
discussions from the past to the present and to treat constitutional 
interpretation in light of an active and vibrant religious reality rather 
than a static and uniform religious history. 
III. CONCLUSION 
When all is said and done, the historical account of church and 
state in the early republic leaves us right where we started: facing a 
 
 46. Thomas Jefferson, To Nehemiah Dodge and Others, A Committee of the Danbury 
Baptist Association, in the State of Connecticut (1802), reprinted in THE PORTABLE THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 303 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975). 
 47. Madison wrote: 
During almost fifteen centuries, has the legal establishment of Christianity been on 
trial.  What have been its fruits? More or less in all places, pride and indolence in the 
Clergy; ignorance and servility in the laity; in both, superstition, bigotry and 
persecution . . . . What influence in fact have ecclesiastical establishments had on 
Civil Society? In some  instances they have been seen to erect a spiritual tyranny on 
the ruins of the Civil authority; in many instances they have been seen upholding 
the thrones of political tyranny; in no instance have they been seen the guardians of 
the liberties of the people. Rulers who wished to subvert the public liberty, may have 
found an established clergy convenient auxiliaries. A just Government, instituted to 
secure & perpetuate, it needs them not. 
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments ¶¶ 7–8 (1785), 
reprinted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 67–68 (1947).  
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complicated picture of a religiously diverse culture and the difficult 
task of configuring for ourselves a constitutional regime in which 
religion and religious organizations can flourish but not oppress. 
However, an honest fealty to history will yield an Establishment 
Clause that no religiously pluralistic modern democracy would want 
or accept. If the concept of establishment means nothing more than 
the prohibition of establishing any particular branch of 
Protestantism, then we may as well not have an Establishment Clause 
at all. We are not, as most of the Framers probably believed, a 
Protestant nation. Nor, for that matter, are we a Christian nation, 
nor even a uniformly religious nation. In this diverse political 
atmosphere, allegiance to religious ideals or religious institutions is 
not a logically necessary component of virtuous political governance, 
even if most of our forefathers believed it to be so. 
None of this is intended to suggest that the history studiously 
recounted by Professor Esbeck is irrelevant to the determination of 
what the religion clauses mean. The point here is that the history 
must be kept in perspective. History frames the discussion about 
constitutional meaning and provides a context in which the various 
dimensions of constitutional questions can be viewed in sharp relief. 
History provokes us to ask the right questions, but it will never give 
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